tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post4843678556930132423..comments2024-03-17T14:21:16.214-04:00Comments on Truthbomb : Featured Article: Do Objective Moral Values Exist? by Neil ShenviChadhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16449550583016519343noreply@blogger.comBlogger69125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-59336798441355379742012-06-16T17:36:07.820-04:002012-06-16T17:36:07.820-04:00I've only just seen Neil's three posts sta...I've only just seen Neil's three posts starting 11 June, 10:45. Sorry that I've not responded to any of the many points there. I saw Graceas' posts following them and forgot to look earlier. Neil has most likely moved on, but there are many points I'd like to respond to, but will probably need to wait till I can use a proper computer to copy/paste the individual quotes I'm responding to.<br /><br />A single question for now though, re:evil God. If a God displayed all the behaviour we currently call evil - torturous, cruel, inconsistent justice, random punishments, perverse actions - what would you call such a being's nature, if you've ruled out calling it evil? Would one be forced to declare His nature 'good by definition'.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-43033474312544477552012-06-16T15:36:20.469-04:002012-06-16T15:36:20.469-04:00A quick point on 'true altruism'. The numb...A quick point on 'true altruism'. The number of opportunities to sacrifice your life for others are small. It happens but is rare, simply because it is not needed that often. If we evolved a capacity to sacrifice ourselves, but most of the time it was exhibited merely in helping others, and this made us more attractive to mates who sensed we would make caring effective parents, then the small occasional loss in carriers of this capacity through self-sacrifice would be off-set by the increased reproductive success.<br /><br />Regarding free riders - these are kept in check by the vilification they receive. Look at our attitude to the unemployed. We don't like to see them starve, and many societies have 'safety nets' to prevent people really suffering, but we equally expect people to make an effort to find work. Our benevolence is not inexhaustible!<br /><br />And of course we class some free riders as criminals and separate them from the rest of society. Survivorship bias means that societies that allowed themselves to become over-run by free-riders would collapse. So the ones that survive are by definition the ones where the reciprocal and 'real' altruists kept the free riders in check.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-45516919580683343502012-06-16T15:27:11.177-04:002012-06-16T15:27:11.177-04:00You asked me why I brought up empathy. Neil object...You asked me why I brought up empathy. Neil objected to me saying it's not surprising that we would evolve to reject, despise or vilify child murderers - such people would be very dangerous to any group. Neil's objection made reference to the 'free rider' problem. My reply was that the free rider problem isn't a valid objection to the idea that group selection would create a species that vilified child murderers.<br /><br />Your OWN interjection in this conversation was to point out that we do vilify child murderers - or something similar (I can't cut and paste on this iPod). My reply to you was that I agreed, and hadn't said anything to the contrary.<br /><br />With regards to empathy, again having empathy benefits us as a species. Other primates have empathy too. And it's another reason we react strongly against sadism etc - we understand the pain of others. We wince when we see even animals in pain.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-29281060516131710282012-06-16T06:45:29.264-04:002012-06-16T06:45:29.264-04:00God is good is not like saying 'God is God'...God is good is not like saying 'God is God', you say. That doesn't solve the problem, which is that describing his nature as good doesn't tell us anything, as good (you say) has no meaning without reference to his nature. You offer a counter example of 'my dad is tall'. That's not the same as saying 'My God is good', where good only has meaning when without reference to the same God. We can define 'tall' without reference to your father - we can explain it and measure it. It's not an abstract concept.<br /><br />So my previous problem with saying 'God is good' still stands, as far as I can see.<br /><br />You ask me to explain my valuing of children if it's not intrinsic. Why does it need to be intrinsic? If I value them then I value them, intrinsic or otherwise. If YOU see their value as intrinsic, why do you place the existence of your God as a condition on their value. They're still the same kids either way, God or not, with exactly the same capacity for suffering. But apparently if there's no God, you suddenly don't care about them, and presumably would happily take the pill; all of which makes me wonder if you ever cared about them in the first place.<br /><br />My baby wakes, will have to address your other points later. Will check out your link, but if it's from WLC then I warn you I've never come across a convincing argument from him.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-76724405396686449712012-06-16T06:32:22.256-04:002012-06-16T06:32:22.256-04:00Graceus, if I was taking the pill so I could carry...Graceus, if I was taking the pill so I could carry out a specific act then either it was an act I would have no problem with carrying out anyway - in which case the pill is superfluous - or the conscience that would have otherwise stopped me carrying out the act (without the pill) would instead stop me taking the pill in the first place. Taking the pill would be equivalent in my mind to carrying out the act that I suspect would follow from taking it, so I'd feel the same guilt as I considered taking it as I would have done considering taking those 1000 kids' lives... and therefore wouldn't take it.<br /><br />Asking what I'd do if I didn't value the lives of others is like asking what you'd do if you didn't place any value on the nature of your God. I don't get the point or implication of the hypothetical.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-80848504010358771992012-06-15T13:35:06.280-04:002012-06-15T13:35:06.280-04:00// Non sequitur - neither does soil erosion. So wh...// Non sequitur - neither does soil erosion. So what? If I value children then by definition they have value. That's what 'valuable' means - that it has value to someone. Introducing a God makes no difference to this. You're just saying they're valuable to God rather than to me. That doesn't make them intrinsically valuable - we could play a thought experiment where I ask you to imagine that God stops valuing the children. You'd then be forced to say the children's lives would stop being valuable! So, not 'inherently valuable'.//<br /><br />My comment was made because you constantly say that you value children. So, do you have intrinsic value for them or instrumental value? If you have the former, how do you explain that when on naturalism, the world is valueless except for the instrumental value you give? I see that you have brought up another thought experiment (the first of which I answered), but you have not honored my repeated requests of answering mine. What is so hard about answering the questions: If you do not value children, but desired and valued a house more, would you take the amorality pill and kill the children in order to obtain your desire-the house? Why or why not?<br /><br />//If you're saying you'd be happy to go round slaughtering children, why should I listen to anything you have to say about morality, objective or otherwise?//<br /><br />First, you mischaracterize my position. My position is that I would obey God because He commanded it, God has reasons, because God’s nature is good, His reasons for his commands are good.<br /><br />Secondly, God would not command evil. An evil, all-good being is an oxymoron and would not exist. I offer the following argument:<br /><br /><br />A. No act commanded by a necessarily good being is evil<br />B. A command is _perceived_ to be evil.<br />C. Therefore, it is either not the case that the command was given or the command was not given by a necessarily good being.<br /><br /><br />This is actually a tangent, so I’m not going to dwell on it, but just as President Truman’s command can be perceived to be evil, and it actually wasn’t, so commands by God may be perceived as evil and are not actually evil. If the command is actually evil, then it is not a command that is issued by God.Graceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-11439467927189818162012-06-15T13:34:05.667-04:002012-06-15T13:34:05.667-04:00//You're saying that God's nature has a ce...//You're saying that God's nature has a certain aspect. You give it a label. You say that his nature is the standard for that label. That doesn't really get you anywhere.”<br />"Goodness gives additional information about God"<br /><br />No it doesn't. Because you're arguing that 'goodness' can only be defined by reference to God.//<br /><br />The example I gave of ‘my dad is tall’ and ‘my dad is a male parent’ illustrates perfectly how there is additional information making the first statement meaningful, so we can see that whenever we say, “God is good”, we are not saying “God is God”. <br /><br />“You've not answered the question. You've just told me that Jews and Christians have long held it as a belief that their God is omni-benevolent. My question remains - by whose definition: yours, theirs or their God's? What does 'benevolent' even mean if you can't define it without making reference back to God's nature? You're basically saying "God's nature is benevolent. Benevolent is defined by God's nature". This remains tautology regardless of any other attributes you assign to your God's nature.”<br /><br />I am going by the Jewish and Christian belief. This isn’t an ad hoc definition because it was around long before Jews and Christians thought of apologetic arguments. P1 of the Moral Argument is: _If_ God does not exist, then OMVs do not exist. This is a logical argument. If you reverse that, it is logically possible that if God does exist, OMVs exist, and to refer to goodness as being part of God’s nature is not an incoherent concept. You would have to prove otherwise if you say it is. This link explains how there is no problem with God’s character as the paradigm for goodness. I'd read it before trying to argue this further. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/personal-god#ixzz1xsmMrdx7.<br /><br />// Great, but 'empathy' does not equal 'true altruism', so my point stands.//<br /><br />I am not sure why you are bringing empathy up, when Neil’s evidence is about true altruism and not just ‘empathy’. Was it supposed to refute Neil’s evidence? If it was, that is not what Neil’s evidence is about.Graceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-27387306585329528062012-06-13T15:29:45.526-04:002012-06-13T15:29:45.526-04:00And I repeat...
This is merely an ad hominem argu...And I repeat...<br /><br />This is merely an <i>ad hominem</i> argument and further comments on this topic will not be published. <br /><br />RespectfullyChadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16449550583016519343noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-6319636182203160282012-06-13T14:49:37.632-04:002012-06-13T14:49:37.632-04:00Readers can find an excellent article here that de...Readers can find an excellent article <a href="http://www.bethinking.org/suffering/intermediate/the-absurdity-of-life-without-god.htm" rel="nofollow">here</a> that deals with the question of ultimate value.<br /><br />Further, I would like to remind everyone that we demand all those commenting be treated respectfully and cordially.<br /><br />Thank youChadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16449550583016519343noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-74226431070132888682012-06-13T07:30:14.105-04:002012-06-13T07:30:14.105-04:00"But it seems to me that all this is an effor..."But it seems to me that all this is an effort to avoid God. If OMVs existed, it is possible that God grounds them"<br /><br />I think I've already said that I don't see how a God existing would make any difference to the existence of OMV, or the coherence of the concept. Therefore the question has nothing to do with avoiding God.<br /><br />"1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist."<br /> Asserted premise not backed up by argument.<br />2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. <br /> Unproven assertion.<br />3. Therefore, God exists. <br /> Conclusion built on unproven assertions.<br /><br />"Another reason why it would not be a tautology is because goodness is not the only attribute of God"<br /><br />That doesn't stop it being a tautology.<br /><br />You're saying that God's nature has a certain aspect. You give it a label. You say that his nature is the standard for that label. That doesn't really get you anywhere.<br /><br />"Goodness gives additional information about God"<br /><br />No it doesn't. Because you're arguing that 'goodness' can only be defined by reference to God. <br /><br />"Before this argument was even thought of, Jews and Christians have long held the belief that God (not ‘god’) is by definition omni benevolent, so it’s neither circular, ad hoc, or subjective."<br /><br />You've not answered the question. You've just told me that Jews and Christians have long held it as a belief that their God is omni-benevolent. My question remains - by whose definition: yours, theirs or their God's? What does 'benevolent' even mean if you can't define it without making reference back to God's nature? You're basically saying "God's nature is benevolent. Benevolent is defined by God's nature". This remains tautology regardless of any other attributes you assign to your God's nature.<br /><br />"However, you seem to equate the origin of true altruism with positive or ambivalent feelings some people have to murderers and child torturers"<br /><br />What do you mean, I 'seem' to? At no point have I said that. If anything I said the opposite! I said that we reject these people, we decry them. It doesn't say much for your argument when it is based on believing I hold exactly the opposite view to my actual and stated view.<br /><br />"You say that empathy is beneficial for humans, but Neil has already cited Dawkins and Coyne as saying that true altruism doesn’t benefit a group"<br /><br />Great, but 'empathy' does not equal 'true altruism', so my point stands.<br /><br />"You seem to want children to have instrinsic value, but naturalism doesn’t support that"<br /><br />Non sequitur - neither does soil erosion. So what? If I value children then by definition they have value. That's what 'valuable' means - that it has value to someone. Introducing a God makes no difference to this. You're just saying they're valuable to God rather than to me. That doesn't make them intrinsically valuable - we could play a thought experiment where I ask you to imagine that God stops valuing the children. You'd then be forced to say the children's lives would stop being valuable! So, not 'inherently valuable'.<br /><br />"If the commander in chief ordered you, a pilot, to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of men, women, and children to end a war, would you do it? If it were me, I would."<br /><br />And by that logic you'd also obey your 'Commander in Chief' if he was Hitler asking you to help in the Holocaust.<br /><br />"So to answer your question, yes I would. "<br /><br />If you're saying you'd be happy to go round slaughtering children, why should I listen to anything you have to say about morality, objective or otherwise? Why does that make you better than anyone who chooses to take that pill? You say I cannot decry Hitler, but you actually back him to the hilt - by all means murder in the name of God if you think you're doing His work.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-87641882098013957792012-06-12T18:08:30.452-04:002012-06-12T18:08:30.452-04:00//"His good nature is the absolute standard f...//"His good nature is the absolute standard for goodness."<br /><br />If I told you that my 'chong' nature is the standard 'chong', then you'd be forgiven for saying that I wasn't actually telling you anything. A coherent definition of a term shouldn't contain the term itself, much less RELY on that term. Yet you tell me that God's 'good' nature is the standard for 'goodness'. What do you mean when you call his nature 'good', if 'good' only carries meaning when related to his nature?//<br /><br />If you look at Neil’s answer, you can’t get more basic than the definition he gave for goodness. Goodness is a part of God’s unchanging nature, so it is the absolute standard. Since I think you’re going to claim it is a tautology, let me answer that for you. It would be a tautology if goodness and God were identical. Consider these two sentences: ‘My father is tall’ and ‘My father is my male parent’. The former sentence provides additional information about my father while the latter sentence provides no new information ( ‘my father’ IS by definition ‘my male parent’. Goodness gives additional information about God. Another reason why it would not be a tautology is because goodness is not the only attribute of God; God is also just, loving, caring, merciful. Again, I did not come up with the description of God’s nature- it is a belief long held by Christians and Jews.<br /><br />I also want to address a comment you made to Neil: “re: the Euth Dilemma. You're defining your way out of it. If I start by merely 'defining' murder or unfairness or whatever as being wrong 'by definition' then I can build objective moral values till the cows come home. But both you and I would be 'smuggling in' the objective part. And starting by asserting that 'I define God as the paradigm of moral goodness' is certainly 'smuggling in the objective'.” <br /><br />You complain about “objective” being smuggled in when we posit God as the grounds for objective morality, but I have an objection. First, I don’t think I ever saw the Moral Argument presented, so here it is<br />1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. <br />2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. <br />3. Therefore, God exists. <br /><br />Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument#ixzz1xcNgoa9q<br />You seem to want to deny premise 1, but you would have to adopt the view that OMVs exist, which you don’t. But it seems to me that all this is an effort to avoid God. If OMVs existed, it is possible that God grounds them, and if God does, then we all have to answer for the evil we have done. This evil prevents us from having a relationship with a Holy God. But there is a way to restore that relationship. I'll refer you to Neil’s last comment which sums up what really goes on when we think about morals.Graceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-6088025636333676022012-06-12T18:04:22.638-04:002012-06-12T18:04:22.638-04:00“I already answered:
1) A tiny minority of 6% isn&...“I already answered:<br />1) A tiny minority of 6% isn't that compelling. How do you explain the 44% who disagree? <br />2) They said they supported moral-realism, which I don't think is quite the same thing as OMV<br />3) The majority are atheists, meaning they don't even think moral-realism is explained by God (what's your explanation for that?).<br />4) The percentage who don't believe in God vastly outweighs the percentage who support 'moral realism', so it's special pleading to say they're an authority on the latter but not the former. Neil argues that they're hopelessly confused about the existence of God, but are to trustworthy authorities on moral realism. This is special pleading.”<br /><br />1). I can give an explanation-my explanation is that they don’t want to see morals as real because then evil will truly exist and if there is moral evil, then there is a moral law-giver who they would have to answer to for moral evils that have been committed.<br />2). That means morals are not illusory, which means they can be objective.<br />3). They have found another way to ground morals without God.<br />4). We’re not appealing to authority. We’re merely looking for an explanation that best explains the figures. My explanation for why there are more atheist philosophers than theist philosophers is because some of them choose disbelief for volitional reasons. <br /><br />Now that I have offered explanations, can you give me an explanation as to why the majority of philosophers would choose to believe that morals are objective and not subjective?<br /><br />//"However, God, by _definition_, is omni benevolent"<br /><br />By whose definition? His own? That's circular. Yours? That's subjective.//<br /><br />You seem to think this is some ad hoc reasoning. Before this argument was even thought of, Jews and Christians have long held the belief that God (not ‘god’) is by definition omni benevolent, so it’s neither circular, ad hoc, or subjective.Graceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-82624551636233554162012-06-12T18:00:59.710-04:002012-06-12T18:00:59.710-04:00“My point is that you're not saying anything t...“My point is that you're not saying anything there that I disagree with, or is a problem for anything I said. Experts on sociopaths and psychopaths, such as Simon Baron-Cohen argue that such people very much DO have something wrong with their cognitive faculties. Often it relates to not going through the normal childhood process of developing empathy.” <br /><br />We agree there. However, you seem to equate the origin of true altruism with positive or ambivalent feelings some people have to murderers and child torturers, and as I said before, people do not think of others who perform altruistic acts as having anything wrong with their cognitive faculties. So, I don’t see how your question of how ambivalent feelings towards murderers did anything to refute Neil’s evidence, nor have I seen a positive claim offered to as a rebuttal. You say that empathy is beneficial for humans, but Neil has already cited Dawkins and Coyne as saying that true altruism doesn’t benefit a group. You are free to still cite sources to justify your claim if you think that true altruism did evolve to benefit groups.<br /><br />“You're speculating about what I'd do if I held wildly different values…. I probably wouldn't NEED the pill if I was such a person, but the question is a bit pointless. I might as well ask you whether you would go round slaughtering children if you believed it was what your God wanted you to do.” <br /><br />The question posed by Neil is a thought experiment. I am able to play along and answer _your_ thought experiment. Allow me to make an analogy. If the commander in chief ordered you, a pilot, to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of men, women, and children to end a war, would you do it? If it were me, I would. So to answer your question, yes I would. There are three reasons why I would obey God’s command in your thought experiment: 1). We are commanded to obey God’s commands 2). We know God has reasons (just like President Truman had reasons) for his commands 3). Since God is by definition omni benevolent, then I can trust that His commands are true to His nature.<br /><br />“… basically what I'd do if I was a sociopath.” <br /><br />That is interesting that you say that I’m comparing you to a sociopath, which it seems to me you abhor. Are you saying that you would have remorse or guilt if you killed 1,000 children? What is wrong with a sociopath on your view if he is only doing what is instrumental to him? You seem to want children to have instrinsic value, but naturalism doesn’t support that-it only supports instrumental value, so if you decided one day that you didn’t value children, my question again is what would stop you from killing 1000 children? Would you do it? I’d appreciate it if you would answer the question according to the thought experiment-the one where you didn’t value children but desired a house.<br /><br />“And yes, this empathy is beneficial to the species as a whole.” <br /><br />We are talking about _true_ altruism benefitting group selection. Since Neil cited a source, I’d like to see your source that backs your claim that _true_altruism evolved out of benefit to group selection. Can you produce it?<br /><br />“I might as well say that you can't be outraged either, but should just conclude that you and Hitler simply had a disagreement over what your God wanted him to do. He thought God wanted him to kill Jews, you disagree. Likewise the 9/11 terrorists. You all think you're carrying out God's plan, you just disagree on what the plan is.”<br /><br />Well, on our view, we can be outraged. But since on your worldview morality is subjective, you have no reason to, neither can your claims of injustice (God and the Canaanites, e.g.) be influential in persuading people to see that God is truly evil.Graceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-37533881704739429762012-06-12T06:43:06.132-04:002012-06-12T06:43:06.132-04:00"...basically, there’s no need on your view t..."...basically, there’s no need on your view to be outraged by the 911 terror acts on the Twin Towers or Hitler’s annihilation of the Jews or when people’s civil rights are taken away because morality is subjective to each individual on atheism!"<br /><br />I might as well say that you can't be outraged either, but should just conclude that you and Hitler simply had a disagreement over what your God wanted him to do. He thought God wanted him to kill Jews, you disagree. Likewise the 9/11 terrorists. You all think you're carrying out God's plan, you just disagree on what the plan is.<br /><br />Put another way, you'll find no greater consensus on morality among theists or Christians than among atheists. <br /><br />"which was what I was trying to get from you-an explanation as to why the majority of philosophers would choose OMVs over SMVs. Do you have an explanation that supports your view better? If not, then Neil is justified in his explanation of the evidence."<br /><br />I already answered:<br />1) A tiny minority of 6% isn't that compelling. How do you explain the 44% who disagree? <br />2) They said they supported moral-realism, which I don't think is quite the same thing as OMV<br />3) The majority are atheists, meaning they don't even think moral-realism is explained by God (what's your explanation for that?).<br />4) The percentage who don't believe in God vastly outweighs the percentage who support 'moral realism', so it's special pleading to say they're an authority on the latter but not the former. Neil argues that they're hopelessly confused about the existence of God, but are to trustworthy authorities on moral realism. This is special pleading.<br /><br />"However, God, by _definition_, is omni benevolent"<br /><br />By whose definition? His own? That's circular. Yours? That's subjective.<br /><br />"His good nature is the absolute standard for goodness."<br /><br />If I told you that my 'chong' nature is the standard 'chong', then you'd be forgiven for saying that I wasn't actually telling you anything. A conherent definition of a term shouldn't contain the term itself, much less RELY on that term. Yet you tell me that God's 'good' nature is the standard for 'goodness'. What do you mean when you call his nature 'good', if 'good' only carries meaning when related to his nature?Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-18692020314619412492012-06-12T06:41:32.169-04:002012-06-12T06:41:32.169-04:00Graceus, in your first post you said: "Genera...Graceus, in your first post you said: "Generally, we see those feelings that some people have towards murderers and people who torture children as unnatural. We tend to think of people who feel that way as having something wrong with their cognitive faculties"<br /><br />My point is that you're not saying anything there that I disagree with, or is a problem for anything I said. Experts on sociopaths and psychopaths, such as Simon Baron-Cohen argue that such people very much DO have something wrong with their cognitive faculties. Often it relates to not going through the normal childhood process of developing empathy.<br /><br />Why do you think this contradicts anything I said? I would expect this to be the case. Empathy is beneficial for humans.<br /><br />"Also, I am still wondering, since you haven't answered my question yet, if you no longer valued children, but you valued and desired a house more..."<br /><br />You're speculating about what I'd do if I held wildly different values - basically what I'd do if I was a sociopath. I probably wouldn't NEED the pill if I was such a person, but the question is a bit pointless. I might as well ask you whether you would go round slaughtering children if you believed it was what your God wanted you to do.<br /><br />Neil argues that it might be beneficial for a tribe to prize the value of hurting outsiders to the tribe. To a certain extent we DO see that people are less empathetic to outsiders. 'Charity begins at home', we say. And you'll notice that filicide rates are much higher when it is a step-child or adopted child rather than blood relative. <br /><br />Our brains are complicated, evolved over millions of years. Each new part just got added to the previous bits - mammal brain built on lizard brain etc, and there was little in the way of a 'backwards' step. The great book 'Kluge' uses the analogy of a factory that is upgraded many times over a long time period, but which cannot ever stop production, meaning that the very oldest technology still works alongside the newest, often performing the same function or competing to do so.<br /><br />So we all have many competing instincts and desires, come much more 'knee-jerk', less reasoned and instant than others. We evolved distrust of outsiders, we evolved instincts to get 'something for nothing' if we can, we evolved competitive instincts with our peers. At the same time we evolved kindness, compassion and empathy. And we also evolved instincts to think badly of others who indulge in more selfish instincts. All the above carries benefits for either ourselves or our group as a whole. And all these instincts compete with each other in complicated way, and are influenced by the culture of the group you live in. <br /><br />Generally kindness and empathy wins out. Sometimes even the more selfish urges are prized by others too. But it's not surprising that more 'negative' instincts are often kept in check by other instincts to think badly of others who exhibit them.<br /><br />But still we all generally have empathy, such that we can be touched by great suffering among foreigners thousands of miles away, although we'll never meet them. And yes, this empathy is beneficial to the species as a whole. Even if it leads to acts that do NOT benefit the species directly, such as trying to stop an animal feeling pain, it is still the result of something we developed because it was beneficial.<br /><br />Look at how primates in groups act to each other - they have all these instincts too. They developed long before we could rationalise them or think through our actions on a deeper level. I know a common view among experts is that our explanations for why we did something are often just post-hoc rationalisations for decisions we made completely instinctively.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-51212498157907923022012-06-11T23:14:39.725-04:002012-06-11T23:14:39.725-04:00Andrew,
Since this conversation seems like it is w...Andrew,<br />Since this conversation seems like it is winding down, I wanted to make two last points. In response to the Cipher question, you have repeatedly stated 'I value children more than brick and mortar.' From the standpoint of moral antirealism, this is just your personal opinion, which is no different than the statements 'I value pickles more than olives' or 'I value my personal pleasure more than the suffering of innocent people.' I want to make two points.<br /><br />First, I seriously, seriously doubt you feel that way. If you actually encountered someone who valued their personal pleasure over the suffering of thousands of children, you would not merely react with personal distaste. You would react with moral revulsion. Your worldview might leave you incapable of actually naming your sentiments. But what your conscience would be screaming is 'That is wrong! That is evil!' You might have to suppress this reaction intellectually because it is inconsistent with your worldview. But it would be there. Is it really reasonable, then, to adopt a worldview which cannot explain (and indeed denies reality to) your most basic, immediate perceptions of right and wrong?<br /><br />But the second point is far more personal, which is why I saved it to the end. You repeatedly deny that you would accept Cipher's offer. But you are wrong. Not only would accept it hypothetically, you are accepting it daily. And so am I. <br /><br />There are 15 million AIDS orphans in Africa. 21% of all children in the US live in poverty. Every time you and I go out to dinner, buy new clothing, or go to a movie, we are making Cipher's choice. We are not loving our neighbor as ourselves. We are opting for personal pleasure, for 'brick and mortar' over the lives of millions of children. We are guilty.<br /><br />That is not all. Would you turn down the amorality pill? No. Nor would I. In fact, we are taking it every day. How many hours do we spend each day reading about the horrors of life in a third-world slum? Are we stirring up our consciences to move us to do whatever we can to help these people? No. We have opted for a numbed, sleeping conscience instead of a conscience grieving and wounded on behalf of the grieving and wounded. We know that, if we actually awoke our conscience to the horrendous suffering around us, we would not be able to take it. It would make us sad. So we choose to distract ourselves with work, family, entertainment, video games, hobbies. We choose personal pleasure of costly compassion. We choose daily to escape from the moral reality that confronts us at every turn.<br /><br />Is this true of you? It is true of me. This, as I said in my essay, is the appeal of moral relativism. It allows us to suppress the uneasy knowledge that we are moral failures.<br /><br />Christianity is the only religion to correctly and uncompromisingly diagnose our problem and is the only religion to provide a solution: God's grace is available to the worst of sinners. I would sincerely urge you to take these arguments seriously. Christianity is not primarily reached at the end of a philosophical argument. It is primarily reached through an admission of our moral filth before a perfect and holy God and a desperate cry for his mercy. That mercy is offered to you freely at the cross of Christ. You can have it.<br />-NeilNeil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-72546077950304786912012-06-11T22:46:00.849-04:002012-06-11T22:46:00.849-04:00I wrote: "You have raised both the Euthyphro ...I wrote: "You have raised both the Euthyphro Dilemma and the 'Evil God' challenge, but I have answered both."<br /><br />You wrote: "And I answered back re: the Euth Dilemma. You're defining your way out of it. If I start by merely 'defining' murder or unfairness or whatever as being wrong 'by definition' then I can build objective moral values till the cows come home."<br /><br />Yes, but this dispute is not over whether OMVs exist, but what is a viable _ground_ for OMVs. I can define murder as wrong, but then I have to provide an objective _referent_ to which 'wrongness' corresponds. This is the entire project of naturalistic moral theory! The theist provides a _ground_ for OMVs; they are grounded in God's nature. That is the element of reality to which 'goodness' corresponds. Similarly, you need to provide a naturalistic _ground_ for 'wrongness.' If you'd like to defend utilitarianism or contractarianism, we can do that.<br />-NeilNeil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-59084588205610731642012-06-11T22:45:49.646-04:002012-06-11T22:45:49.646-04:00"I still value the lives of kids more than br..."I still value the lives of kids more than bricks and mortar, therefore the rational decision would still be not to take the house."<br /><br />Yes, but then you have no reason at all not to take the amorality pill! You would still value whatever you value before taking the pill; you would just have no guilt. So would you take the pill? Are you really telling me that your behavior is never, ever influenced by negative moral emotions? If these emotions are _purely_ illusions, pointing to no objective referent, then can you provide a reason that you would not leap at the opportunity to be free of them, to live a life unshackled by conscience? <br /><br />Isn't it clear that something in you is horrified by the idea of becoming an amoral, conscience-less monster? But why? Unless, deep down inside, we know that our moral feelings point to an objective referent,<br /><br />"For that sentence to make sense you need to define what you mean by 'moral goodness'."<br /><br />A theist and an atheist can both recognize moral goodness as a basic quality of actions such as compassion, love, justice, mercy, etc... There is no 'more basic' definition of moral goodness, any more than there is a 'more basic' definition of 'color' or 'here'. So the question is not at all over the definition of 'moral goodness' but over what furnishes the _ground_ or _basis_ of moral goodness. It is here that the theist posits God as the basis of moral goodness. We are positing the existence of a being whose character exemplifies the qualities of moral goodness that we all recognize.<br /><br />I wrote: "Second, because evil is a privation of goodness. Good can exist without evil but evil cannot exist without good."<br /><br />You wrote: "Who says? That's pure assertion."<br /><br />Ok, let's consider some evils. For every instance of evil, there is some good which is either absent or distorted. That is precisely what we mean when something is evil; it is not as it _ought_ to be. I can't even conceive of calling something 'evil' except by comparison to a good. But this phenomena does not apply to goodness. A thing can be good in itself with no reference to evil. So now that I've presented an argument in support of my contention, you can provide a counter-argument.<br /><br />Additionally, you have not addressed the objection that a 'God who does wrong' would have to violate moral obligations imposed by a superior entity and thus could not be metaphysically ultimate. <br /><br />I wrote: "So if Christianity in particular is true, we would not necessarily expect to see it accepted by the majority of philosophers."<br /><br />Yo wrote: "Sorry Neil, but this is hogwash. Either you cite the philosopher's majority opinion as evidence on your side or you don't."<br /><br />No, this it the way Bayesian confirmation theory works. The atheistic beliefs of philosophers is only evidence insofar as it would not be expected if Christianity were true. In the same way, the observation 'My carpet is dry' is only evidence that 'it did not rain last night' if I have reason to believe that if it _had_ rained last night, my carpet _would_ be wet. If you're curious about this issue, look up 'Bayesian confirmation theory.'Neil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-45776494201127391782012-06-11T15:29:29.314-04:002012-06-11T15:29:29.314-04:00Hello, Andrew. Actually, with the first paragraph...Hello, Andrew. Actually, with the first paragraph you only asked a question which I explained, but Neil explained it better. So, it was only an explanation, but I have to point out that you actually didn’t have a counter-argument for Neil’s claim of the free rider problem.<br /><br />Regarding the second paragraph, your complaint is that I need to presuppose a good God first. However, God, by _definition_, is omni benevolent. His good nature is the absolute standard for goodness. You have not answered my objection to the Evil God argument. Since you deny that OMVs exist, God cannot be objectively evil on your worldview. It can only be your subjective preference or opinion that God is a baddie; basically, there’s no need on your view to be outraged by the 911 terror acts on the Twin Towers or Hitler’s annihilation of the Jews or when people’s civil rights are taken away because morality is subjective to each individual on atheism!<br /><br />I just read Neil’s reply to you, “An explanation need not encounter zero counterevidence: it need merely have more evidence in its favor than against it,” which was what I was trying to get from you-an explanation as to why the majority of philosophers would choose OMVs over SMVs. Do you have an explanation that supports your view better? If not, then Neil is justified in his explanation of the evidence.<br /><br />The point I was trying to show with my original comment was that you have offered nothing that refutes any of Neil’s evidence for OMVs. Also, I am still wondering, since you haven't answered my question yet, if you no longer valued children, but you valued and desired a house more, what is there to prohibit you from taking the pill and killing the children in order for you to obtain your heart's desire? Would you then do it? Why or why not?<br /><br />Hopefully I didn't post this twiceGraceushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03750900214438922086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-38531813209637944482012-06-11T08:51:44.055-04:002012-06-11T08:51:44.055-04:00"The theist says "God's perfectly go..."The theist says "God's perfectly good character is the ground of OMVs." The atheist replies "But what if God is evil?" To which Grace correctly asks "What did you mean when you just used the word 'evil'?"<br /><br />You've got it backwards. The atheist is merely pointing out the [correct!] question: "What did you mean when you just used the phrase 'Perfectly good character'?"<br /><br />"The amorality pill would merely remove your illusory negative moral emotions without forcing you to do anything. It would allow you to kill children without guilt, but would not force you to do it."<br /><br />I read it perfectly well thank you. I already pointed out that it presupposes that 'guilt' is the reason or at least a major reason that I don't kill kids. If you think this applies to yourself then fair enough, but don't judge me by your own standards. My previous answer stands perfectly well. Saying 'It wouldn't force you to do it' is neither here nor there.<br /><br />"You could then rationally, unemotionally decide whether the big house was more likely to bring you happiness than the lives of a thousand children"<br /><br />I still value the lives of kids more than bricks and mortar, therefore the rational decision would still be not to take the house. The question of how much happiness the kids bring me is irrelevant to my decision.<br /><br />"First, theists define God as the paradigm of moral goodness."<br /><br />For that sentence to make sense you need to define what you mean by 'moral goodness'.<br /><br />"But since the data is what I have stated, you need to deal with it as it is rather than speculating about what might happen in the future."<br /><br />You miss my point. I was pointing out that the majority you refer to is just a few percentage points, not particularly significant.<br /><br />"Second, because evil is a privation of goodness. Good can exist without evil but evil cannot exist without good."<br /><br />Who says? That's pure assertion. Is it only true if there's a perfectly moral God, or would it be true regardless? If the former, then it's a circular argument to use the assertion as an argument FOR a perfectly moral God.<br /><br />"So if Christianity in particular is true, we would not necessarily expect to see it accepted by the majority of philosophers."<br /><br />Sorry Neil, but this is hogwash. Either you cite the philosopher's majority opinion as evidence on your side or you don't. <br /><br />"However, against this observation I would set a vast amount of other evidence: philosophical, scientific, and historical."<br /><br />And I'd equally claim the above is all evidence against, but that's irrelevant anyway – your argument is special pleading Neil.<br /><br />"You have raised both the Euthyphro Dilemma and the 'Evil God' challenge, but I have answered both."<br /><br />And I answered back re: the Euth Dilemma. You're defining your way out of it. If I start by merely 'defining' murder or unfairness or whatever as being wrong 'by definition' then I can build objective moral values till the cows come home. But both you and I would be 'smuggling in' the objective part. And starting by asserting that 'I define God as the paradigm of moral goodness' is certainly 'smuggling in the objective'.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-89463598738487709092012-06-10T23:36:44.183-04:002012-06-10T23:36:44.183-04:00Andrew,
In reply to Grace, you wrote:
"Your s...Andrew,<br />In reply to Grace, you wrote:<br />"Your second para: The point is that using God to explain OMVs is that it presupposes a good God. You have to start by asserting 'God is morally perfect'."<br /><br />Here, you're mistaken. The theist says "God's perfectly good character is the ground of OMVs." The atheist replies "But what if God is evil?" To which Grace correctly asks "What did you mean when you just used the word 'evil'?"<br /><br />That is a question that the atheist cannot answer. I grant that the theist defines God as perfectly good. But when the atheist talks about 'an evil God' has has just uttered an incoherent phrase ('an evil perfectly-good-being'). Unless you can provide us with some coherent explanation of what you mean by 'an evil perfectly-good-being', your objection is not meaningful.<br /><br />And if you define 'God' to be 'a perfectly bad being', then you will have to answer the objections I raised above to such a definition (evil as privation; wrong as transgression of moral obligation).Neil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-84096980780419361452012-06-10T23:29:11.581-04:002012-06-10T23:29:11.581-04:00"56.3% Accept or lean toward: moral realism. ..."56.3% Accept or lean toward: moral realism. As a quick tangent, does that mean if just 6.3% changed their mind that you'd accept that as an argument AGAINST OMV? That's not particularly compelling."<br /><br />That is correct. If the data on moral realism changes, then you can use it as an argument in favor of moral anti-realism. But since the data is what I have stated, you need to deal with it as it is rather than speculating about what might happen in the future.<br /><br />"But far worse, 72.8% of the same polled philosophers claim to lean towards atheism, a MUCH greater number....Again, using your logic, these philosophers 'give these matters careful thought', and therefore their opinion is part of cumulative evidence AGAINST OMV being evidence for a God."<br /><br />Sort of. There are two problems here. <br /><br />The first is that this observation only counts as evidence against God's existence if the hypothesis that 'God exists' cannot account for the unbelief of professional philosophers. I can't speak for other religions, but Christianity does indeed account for this phenomena. The Bible goes out of its way to state that God is not discovered by the wildly intelligent, brilliant, successful, strong and powerful, but by the weak, humble, and despised (see 1 Cor. 1). So if Christianity in particular is true, we would not necessarily expect to see it accepted by the majority of philosophers. <br /><br />Second, you correctly point out that the opinion of philosophers would only be one point in a cumulative case. Abductive reasoning seeks the _best_ explanation for a set of observations. An explanation need not encounter zero counterevidence; it need merely have more evidence in its favor than against it. If we were arguing God's existence, I would be willing to grant that the atheistic beliefs of the majority of philosophers is evidence against it (setting aside my first point for a moment). However, against this observation I would set a vast amount of other evidence: philosophical, scientific, and historical. So it would not be the case of a piece of evidence determining the conclusion, but the weight of a cumulative case.<br /><br />"As I've already pointed out, it's equally problematic if supernaturalism is true. If you can simply define your way out of it in the latter, you can equally define your way out of it with naturalism."<br /><br />First, you have not shown that the theistic account of OMVs is problematic. You have raised both the Euthyphro Dilemma and the 'Evil God' challenge, but I have answered both.<br /><br />Second, you cannot 'define your way out of it' on naturalism. If you think you can (say, by defining 'the good' as 'what contributes to the flourishing of sentient creatures'), you should you listen to the Craig-Harris debate found here:<br />http://www.apologetics315.com/2011/04/william-lane-craig-vs-sam-harris-debate.htmlNeil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-16005078055704707962012-06-10T23:10:03.869-04:002012-06-10T23:10:03.869-04:00"I wouldn't take the amorality pill becau..."I wouldn't take the amorality pill because it would lead me to destroy things that I value."<br /><br />No, not at all. Reread the description. The amorality pill would merely remove your illusory negative moral emotions without forcing you to do anything. It would allow you to kill children without guilt, but would not force you to do it. You could then rationally, unemotionally decide whether the big house was more likely to bring you happiness than the lives of a thousand children whom you had never met without the nagging and erroneous intuition that 'murder is wrong.' <br /><br />"Neil, can you explain to ME how the 'free rider' problem might allow humans to develop POSITIVE or at least ambivalent feelings to murderers and child torturers. Really?"<br /><br />The free-rider problem is a problem for true altruism because it predicts that group selection cannot exist and therefore cannot be used to explain true altruism. <br /><br />As to the question of whether evolution could produce in us positive feelings about murderers and child torturers, this is quite simple. Even in the presence of group selection, murdering or torturing out-group members should be highly favored, because it would allow the in-group community to flourish by out-competing the out-group. So evolution could certainly have produced in us a love and admiration for murderers and child-killers as long as the victims were not part of our tribe. <br /><br />"Regarding Laws' evil God argument, I've already said that I pretty much agree with him. If neither of us have time to do more than refer each other to other people's arguments and responses, then there's a dead end there."<br /><br />I can give you several answers to the 'evil God' objection. <br /><br />First, theists define God as the paradigm of moral goodness. A 'god' like Zeus might be evil, but not God as Christians define him. You can argue that such a God may not exist. But you cannot argue that God might actually be evil any more than we could claim that a square might actually be round.<br /><br />Second, because evil is a privation of goodness, then any metaphysically ultimate being could not be evil. Good can exist without evil but evil cannot exist without good. So an evil being could not be a necessary being because it would be contingent on the existence of a good being. Therefore, if God is a necessary being (as Christians claim) then it is metaphysically impossible for him to be evil.<br /><br />Third, the notion of an 'God who does what is wrong' is incoherent because it requires that such a god violate his moral obligations. But moral obligations can only be imposed by a competent authority. So a 'God who does what is wrong' cannot be metaphysically ultimate; the fact that he can do wrong proves that there must be some higher entity who imposes on him moral duties which he is then able to violate.<br /><br />For all of these reasons, Law's 'evil God' objection fails.Neil Shenvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01453679254084173863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-53414260775780503642012-06-10T16:37:55.578-04:002012-06-10T16:37:55.578-04:00"But what explanation can be given..."
..."But what explanation can be given..."<br /><br />As I've already pointed out, if you're going to make that argument you also have to answer what explanation can be given for a FAR greater majority of philosophers rejecting belief in God. If you're opting for this argument from authority then it actually digs you into a far deeper hole.<br /><br />Your tactic for 'rebutting' me appears to be to completely ignore the actual points I raised.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-117970412806233818.post-314485076170597432012-06-10T16:30:03.383-04:002012-06-10T16:30:03.383-04:00Graceus, I don't think you read my posts caref...Graceus, I don't think you read my posts carefully. Your first paragraph says nothing that argued with anything I said. It seems to be arguing against someone else's points.<br /><br />Your second para: The point is that using God to explain OMVs is that it presupposes a good God. You have to start by asserting 'God is morally perfect'.<br /><br />Your third para says nothing that I didn't address in the post you purport to answer. Read my post again. <br /><br />In short: no part of your post makes a point for me to actually answer.Andrew Ryannoreply@blogger.com