In our ongoing series featuring an argument a week from Peter Kreeft's piece Twenty Arguments God's Existence, we take a look at the Argument from Degrees of Perfection.
Kreeft explains the argument as follows:
We notice around us things that vary in certain ways. A shade of color, for example, can be lighter or darker than another, a freshly baked apple pie is hotter than one taken out of the oven hours before; the life of a person who gives and receives love is better than the life of one who does not.
So we arrange some things in terms of more and less. And when we do, we naturally think of them on a scale approaching most and least. For example, we think of the lighter as approaching the brightness of pure white, and the darker as approaching the opacity of pitch black. This means that we think of them at various "distances" from the extremes, and as possessing, in degrees of "more" or "less," what the extremes possess in full measure.
Sometimes it is the literal distance from an extreme that makes all the difference between "more" and "less." For example, things are more or less hot when they are more or less distant from a source of heat. The source communicates to those things the quality of heat they possess in greater or lesser measure. This means that the degree of heat they possess is caused by a source outside of them.
Now when we think of the goodness of things, part of what we mean relates to what they are simply as beings. We believe, for example, that a relatively stable and permanent way of being is better than one that is fleeting and precarious. Why? Because we apprehend at a deep (but not always conscious) level that being is the source and condition of all value; finally and ultimately, being is better than nonbeing. And so we recognize the inherent superiority of all those ways of being that expand possibilities, free us from the constricting confines of matter, and allow us to share in, enrich and be enriched by, the being of other things. In other words, we all recognize that intelligent being is better than unintelligent being; that a being able to give and receive love is better than one that cannot; that our way of being is better, richer and fuller than that of a stone, a flower, an earthworm, an ant, or even a baby seal.
But if these degrees of perfection pertain to being and being is caused in finite creatures, then there must exist a "best," a source and real standard of all the perfections that we recognize belong to us as beings.
This absolutely perfect being—the "Being of all beings," "the Perfection of all perfections"—is God.1
One could summarize this argument as follows:
1. We observe varying degrees of perfection in things, like goodness or beauty, across the world.
3. Therefore, there must exist a being that possesses the highest degree of perfection, which we call God.
Dr. Kreeft does offer one common rejoinder to the argument that is as follows:
The argument assumes a real "better." But aren't all our judgments of comparative value merely subjective?2
Here is how he responds:
The argument assumes a real "better." But aren't all our judgments of comparative value merely subjective?2
Here is how he responds:
So, what do you think of Dr. Kreeft's argument? Please share in the comments below?
Courage and Godspeed,
Chad
Footnotes:
1. Peter Kreeft, Twenty Arguments God's Existence, 1994.
2. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Comments