As we continue our series on arguments for God's existence offered by philosopher Peter Kreeft here, we consider one of the most controversial arguments in the history of thought - the Ontological Argument.
Kreeft begins by sharing Anselm of Canterbury's version of the argument. It was Anselm who first formulated the argument.
He writes:
Kreeft begins by sharing Anselm of Canterbury's version of the argument. It was Anselm who first formulated the argument.
He writes:
Anselm's Version
1. It is greater for a thing to exist in the mind and in reality than in the mind alone.
2. "God" means "that than which a greater cannot be thought."
3. Suppose that God exists in the mind but not in reality.
4. Then a greater than God could be thought (namely, a being that has all the qualities our thought of God has plus real existence).
5. But this is impossible, for God is "that than which a greater cannot be thought."
6. Therefore God exists in the mind and in reality.1
He (Kreeft) then moves to respond to some common objections offered by detractors of the argument.
Challenge #1
Suppose I deny that God exists in the mind?2
Response
In that case the argument could not conclude that God exists in the mind and in reality. But note: the denial commits you to the view that there is no concept of God. And very few would wish to go that far.3
Challenge #2
Is it really greater for something to exist in the mind and in reality than in the mind alone?4
Response
The first premise of this argument is often misunderstood. People sometimes say: "Isn't an imaginary disease better than a real one?" Well it certainly is better—and so a greater thing—for you that the disease is not real. But that strengthens Anselm's side of the argument. Real bacteria are greater than imaginary ones, just because they have something that imaginary ones lack: real being. They have an independence, and therefore an ability to harm, that nothing can have whose existence is wholly dependent on your thought. It is this greater level of independence that makes them greater as beings. And that line of thinking does not seem elusive or farfetched.5
Challenge #3
Challenge #3
But is real being just another "thought" or "concept"? Is "real being" just one more concept or characteristic (like "omniscience" or "omnipotence") that could make a difference to the kind of being God is?6
Response
Response
Real being does make a real difference. The question is: Does it make a conceptual difference? Critics of the argument say that it does not. They say that just because real being makes all the difference it cannot be one more quality among others. Rather it is the condition of there being something there to have any qualities at all. When the proof says that God is the greatest being that can be "thought," it means that there are various perfections or qualities that God has to a degree no creature possibly could, qualities that are supremely admirable. But to say that such a being exists is to say that there really is something which is supremely admirable. And that is not one more admirable quality among others.
Is it greater to exist in reality as well as in the mind? Of course, incomparably greater. But the difference is not a conceptual one. And yet the argument seems to treat it as if it were—as if the believer and the nonbeliever could not share the same concept of God. Clearly they do. They disagree not about the content of this concept, but about whether the kind of being it describes really exists. And that seems beyond the power of merely conceptual analysis, as used in this argument, to answer. So question 3, we think, really does invalidate this form of the ontological argument.7
Is it greater to exist in reality as well as in the mind? Of course, incomparably greater. But the difference is not a conceptual one. And yet the argument seems to treat it as if it were—as if the believer and the nonbeliever could not share the same concept of God. Clearly they do. They disagree not about the content of this concept, but about whether the kind of being it describes really exists. And that seems beyond the power of merely conceptual analysis, as used in this argument, to answer. So question 3, we think, really does invalidate this form of the ontological argument.7
So, what do you think of Anselm's Ontological Argument? Please share in the comments below!
For those who want to learn more about this version of the argument, I highly recommend this video by Gavin Ortlund.
Next week, we will consider the modal version of the ontological argument.
Courage and Godspeed,
Courage and Godspeed,
Chad
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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