Book Review - Debating God's Existence: Believers and Skeptics in Friendly Conversation Edited by Andrew Drinkard

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I approached this volume with great anticipation.  It features a debate between Christian theist Adam Lloyd Johnson and atheist Dan Barker on the question, Does God Exist?  Following the debate is a series of essays by well-known Christian philosophers, apologists, and skeptics, each offering their own assessment of the arguments presented during the exchange.  The debaters themselves are then given the opportunity to respond to the various critiques and rebuttals offered by the contributors.  And with names such as Robin Collins, Alex Malpass, Joshua Rasmussen, and Benjamin Watkins included, this promised to be a thoughtful and stimulating exploration of one of the most important questions one can ask.

In Chapter 1, Dolores Morris masterfully sets the stage for a substantive discussion with her essay, Disagreeing Well, in which she encourages rational disagreement and highlights the intellectual virtues that should characterize everyone who enters this conversation.  In this reviewer's opinion, the essay alone is worth the price of the book, and Morris's advice deserves to be taken to heart by believers and skeptics alike.

For example, she writes:

"We have much to learn from one another. We can only do so if we take each other's work seriously.  This means...actually reading the arguments for an opposing view.  It means reading them slowly, carefully, and with charity and humility.  It means striving for generous thinking and actively resisting refutation mode. It means reading then rereading, and then reading again" (p. 16).

Hear, hear!

In Chapter 2, we arrive at the heart of the book: the debate between Adam Lloyd Johnson and Dan Barker. Johnson opens by making it clear that he will be defending a form of mere theism—that is, the claim that God exists. As he explains, "...I'm not going to be arguing for Christianity or the Bible specifically. I am only arguing that there is a Supreme Being" (p. 17).  In support of this proposition, Johnson presents three familiar arguments for God's existence: a first-cause argument, a design argument, and a moral argument. In each case, Johnson concisely argues that God provides the best explanation for the phenomena addressed by these arguments.

Barker begins his opening statement with what is, in this reviewer's opinion, a disappointing framing of the debate: "Atheism is simply the absence of theism. So I don't have to get up here and give a bunch of talking points to prove there is no God" (p. 24). However, he then proceeds to do precisely that, offering six reasons why atheists and agnostics do not believe in God.

These include:

  1. The lack of a coherent definition
  2. The lack of good evidence
  3. The lack of good argument
  4. The lack of agreement among believers
  5. The lack of a good reply to the problem of evil
  6. The lack of need to believe

He then continues by offering brief defenses of each of these claims, including, but not limited to, his familiar FANG argument (the free-will argument for the non-existence of God), a questionable critique of abductive reasoning, and a characterization of Johnson's arguments as "God of the gaps" arguments.

Each participant is then given the opportunity to offer a rebuttal and respond to questions.  I appreciated how both contributors made a genuine effort to engage with the points raised by their interlocutor during the debate.  I will discuss the debate portion of the book in greater detail in my conclusion.

In Chapters 3 and 4, Johnson and Barker are given a chance to reflect on the debate and offer further responses to the arguments and evidence presented by their opponent.

The essays that follow—both skeptical and theistic—are where this volume truly shines.

In Chapters 5 and 6, Andrew Drinkard and Joe Folley wrestle with the question, Is God Hiding from Us?  I found both essays to be fair-minded, thoughtful, and genuinely challenging, and I appreciated that J. L. Schellenberg's work served as a kind of blueprint for the discussion.  Moreover, while I freely admit that I am a Christian theist, I nevertheless found myself relating to Folley's observations regarding the sometimes apparent lack of direct encounters with God.

In Chapters 7 and 8, philosophers Robin Collins and Philip Goff grapple with what best explains the observable fine-tuning of our universe.  Collins explains, "...fine-tuning refers to the fact that the universe must be structured to an enormous degree of precision for life to occur..." (p. 129).  While Collins argues that God provides the best explanation for this fine-tuning, Goff contends that, because the God hypothesis must contend with the problem of evil, the multiverse hypothesis is ultimately more probable.

These essays complement one another well.  Although Collins's essay can be somewhat technical at times, the force of the fine-tuning argument is on full display.  Goff's candid yet humble conclusions were equally refreshing.  At several points, one can sense him genuinely wrestling with the challenges facing his own position, and he goes out of his way to engage the opposing view in a fair-minded manner.

In Chapters 9 and 10, Joshua Rasmussen and Benjamin Watkins tackle the question, Does the Immaterial Mind of God Make Sense?  I appreciated that Rasmussen brought immediate clarity to this question by framing it as follows:

"This question invites us to examine the fundamental nature of reality. Broadly, theories of reality fall into two categories: mind-first or mindless first.  Mind-first theories propose that reality is fundamentally mindlike.  According to these views, some form of mind or consciousness exists prior to and gives rise to the material world.  Conversely, 'mindless-first' theories propose the opposite—that nonmental reality is more fundamental, and all mental phenomena emerge from it" (p. 176).

He continues by arguing that mental reality is actually fundamental and challenges the notion that mental causation is somehow a problem for "mind-first" theories.  Watkins counters by expertly pressing the interaction problem.  The interaction problem asks how an immaterial mind can causally influence a material brain.  I appreciated how both contributors clearly defined their terms, went out of their way to narrate their arguments throughout, and offered summaries at various points in their work.  I further appreciated that Watkins was willing to point out the problems with Barker's claim that nonphysical minds are somehow contradictory.

In Chapters 11 and 12, David Baggett and David Enoch consider whether God is necessary to ground objective moral truths.  Baggett argues, with his customary eloquence, that various moral phenomena—including moral duties, intrinsic human value, moral knowledge, and the ultimate harmony of happiness and virtue—are best explained by the existence of God.  Enoch, by contrast, contends that objective moral truths are best understood as fundamental and necessary features of reality.

Interestingly, both Baggett and Enoch express significant disagreements with Barker's treatment of morality.  Baggett demonstrates why he believes Barker's moral theory is conceptually confused, while Enoch explains why he finds Barker's moral views philosophically implausible.

In Chapters 13 and 14, Robert Koons, Alex Malpass, and Daniel Linford consider the question, Did the Universe Have a Cause?  After carefully defining his terms, Koons argues that the causable things in the universe ultimately require a strictly uncausable cause.  To defend this conclusion, he presents two arguments: the argument from the inconceivability of an infinite causal regress and the argument from the inconceivability of an uncaused plurality of causable things (the pluralization argument).

Malpass and Linford respond by challenging William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument, contending that neither Craig's nor Koons's arguments are conclusive and that there are good reasons to question both premises of the Kalam.  While I found Malpass and Linford's essay to be thoughtful and intellectually stimulating, I was ultimately unpersuaded. In my judgment, they rely too heavily on speculative alternative models and arguments that strike me as less compelling than the evidence typically offered in support of the Kalam's two premises.

In Chapters 15 and 16, Johnson and Barker are given the opportunity to respond to the contributors and sum up any final threads of the debate.

Finally, Joseph C. Schmid offers excellent advice on how one can continue their philosophical journey.

He writes:

"Philosophical argumentation shouldn't be seen as a game—something to be won or lost. Rather, it should be seen as a mutual endeavor among fellow seekers striving to uncover truth...we need to cultivate certain intellectual virtues. Without them, we are like sailors lost at sea with nothing to orient us toward the destinations of truth and greater understanding" (p. 360).

He then proceeds to suggest some of the most important virtues for the journey, 13 tips on how to put them into action, and resources for further study.

In conclusion, my only criticism of the volume is the debate itself.  While the subsequent essays feature thoughtful engagement from both theistic and atheistic philosophers, Barker's contributions often lacked the philosophical precision and rigor that characterized the work of the other contributors.  This was evident in his characterization of abductive reasoning as taking one's "best guess," his mischaracterization of Johnson's arguments as "God of the gaps" arguments, and his treatment of objective morality in a way that even one of his atheist peers found problematic.

Overall, I greatly enjoyed this volume and would recommend it to anyone interested in a rigorous and charitable exploration of some of the most important questions concerning our shared existence.  In many ways, the book serves as a model for how both sides of the discussion can engage these issues in a way that is thoughtful, respectful, and intellectually fruitful.

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